Well yes, that is the point. STAR is a compromise with maritarian IRV people. In broad strokes STAR is “Use Utilitarianism to get to the top 2 then use majoritarianism.” These new methods are an attempt to make score more Utilitarian.
Well that is the point of Utilitarianism. It is not just your preference but the magnitude of that preference. STAR ignores all this information on the ballot about the magnitude of the preference and maximises impact for each person. This means that somebodies slight preference could cancel out a life changing preference from another.
Of course. This is why we sum the scores in the standard score system. This is why score is such a compelling system. STAR breaks that argument so you are just arguing for score over STAR.
When people score candidates the scores they give them is dependant on the other candidates. Score relies on there being enough candidates to properly get utilities. I explained this concept in a prior post
So what I am trying to do with this “New STAR” is to account for the fact that we never have the enough candidates for everybodies scores to be on the same scale. What STAR does is reduce it to how they would vote if there had only been two candidates. What I want to do is try to give everybody the same voice but also weight that voice by the utility difference between the top two they expressed on the original ballot.
I have given the Olson reweighing as well as my own to attempt to do this. I am not totally sure that either really does what I want but they both do it more than STAR. I am not saying that means it is better. I am trying to be utilitarian and STAR is intentionally being majoritarian.
If you understand what I am trying to say and have a suggestion for how to do the reweighting in a better way than either I have proposed I would appreciate it. An example I have been thinking about is the following
Suppose that with candidates A,B and C you would score them A:10, B:6, C:0. However, if there was also a candidate D you would have scored them A:3, B:2, C:0, D:10 because you love D. What if the top two turn out to not include D. How do we methodologically keep the information about the relative preference but account for the fact that A and B were suppressed by D being a candidate. Since the scale is different for each person we need this to work for everybody. A person who still likes D the best but is not a total fanatic may score A:9, B:6, C:0, D:10. For these two ballots the ratios of all candidates other than D are the same. If D were not in the race their ballot would look the same so if D is not in the top two runoff I want their ballots to be the same. Make sense?