One idea is to treat equal-rankings as favorably as possible so that in a Condorcet cycle, your vote would be treated as favoring whichever of the candidates you equally ranked in whatever way is necessary to ensure a Condorcet winner from the equal-ranked set of candidates. As an example:
Defeats are A>B by 7:4, B>C by 4:3, and C>A by 7:4. There is an A>B>C>A cycle in which B>C is the weakest defeat (measured by either winning votes or by margins), so that C is elected .
Notice that the two A>B>C voters shown in blue on the bottom line can turn the “lesser evil” B into the Condorcet Winner by “betraying” their favorite “third party” candidate A and voting B>A>C or B>A=C or B>C>A.
Here, the A>B>C voters could vote A=B>C, and in the Condorcet cycle, the vote-counters would probably start by testing flipping their votes to B>A>C (because that would be more likely to change the pairwise matchup between A and B than voting A>B>C, which only increases A’s victory margin over B), and you’d find that B is now the Condorcet winner instead of C.
Improved Condorcet Approval, while passing Favorite Betrayal, isn’t fully Condorcet-compliant.