One idea is to treat equal-rankings as favorably as possible so that in a Condorcet cycle, your vote would be treated as favoring whichever of the candidates you equally ranked in whatever way is necessary to ensure a Condorcet winner from the equal-ranked set of candidates. As an example:

#voters | their vote |
---|---|

2 | A>B>C |

3 | C>A>B |

4 | C=B>A |

2 | A>B>C |

Defeats are A>B by 7:4, B>C by 4:3, and C>A by 7:4. There is an A>B>C>A cycle in which B>C is the weakest defeat (measured by either winning votes or by margins), so that

C is elected.

Notice that the two A>B>C voters shown in blue on the bottom line can turn the â€ślesser evilâ€ť B into the Condorcet Winner by â€śbetrayingâ€ť their favorite â€śthird partyâ€ť candidate A and voting B>A>C or B>A=C or B>C>A.

Here, the A>B>C voters could vote A=B>C, and in the Condorcet cycle, the vote-counters would probably start by testing flipping their votes to B>A>C (because that would be more likely to change the pairwise matchup between A and B than voting A>B>C, which only increases Aâ€™s victory margin over B), and youâ€™d find that B is now the Condorcet winner instead of C.

Improved Condorcet Approval, while passing Favorite Betrayal, isnâ€™t fully Condorcet-compliant.