Strategic voting forces voters to pay attention to others’ preferences, and often requires them to band together in pre-election-defined coalitions. In FPTP, this is largely bad, because it hands power from the people to the duopoly parties. But what if strategic voting was a good thing in other systems where voters had more power to choose their candidates; they might have to work together more, and as a result, compromise and work together to a greater extent. In a system like Israel’s, a voter may have less incentive to consider others if they know their representative will do the work of coalition-building for them, or in Condorcet, they might just rank their honest preferences and walk out of the voting booth. On the other hand, cardinal single-winner and cardinal PR systems might encourage/force a greater amount of strategy (deciding whether to min/max, whether someone meets your approval threshold, etc.) In a consensus-biased PR method, a voter would have to compromise in seats where they’re unsure they can win, forcing them to work with other voters. This could be somewhat of a selling point in the USA, considering that people are generally worried about extremism and “tyranny of the majority” in the government; this may even be one of the reasons districts have prevailed for so long.
And if strategically forced compromise is good, how much, and which methods fall under your threshold?
The other thing to look at is whether such methods can help elect bad people. For example, if you have a 51% majority, with a candidate 40% love and 11% like, a candidate 11% love and 40% merely tolerate, and a candidate 49% like but 51% hate, can these methods help elect the more despised 11% or 49% candidates?