Daily Kos post could use some expertise


#1

The comments are full of standard confusion/FUD.


#2

The Daily Kos pretends to be a progressive blog, but actually it is completely a Democratic Party gatekeeping operation. Like many others, I posted a bunch of progressive articles. Then when election time came around, they simply banned me because I refused to toe the Dem Party line. Anybody really think Hillary Clinton “We came, we saw, he died – Haw haw haw!!!” – is progressive?

They don’t need to know about approval voting, which is fully able to sustain the two-party capture. Anyone who doesn’t understand this needs to do some more homework.

See:

(But perhaps substitute “binary voting” for “bullet voting,” although the logic is the same in this context.)


#3

What I really said was (and it doesn’t take a rocket surgeon to understand this):

But suppose we have strategic hedge simple score voting. We can bestow between five to ten votes (bestow a 50% to 100% portion of assertable support) to each or all of the candidates, or else abstain from bestowing any votes to each (or all) of the candidates. Bullet voting, that is, either bestowing no votes (by abstaining) or bestowing ten votes to each (or all) of the candidates would be a dreadfully poor strategy. We would give zero votes to the Nastycrat, and give ten votes to the Vegecrat, but we would be foolish to give either zero or ten votes to the Sneakycrat. If we did that we would simply be imposing the double bind quandary upon ourselves. That choice could easily turn out to be a completely random decision. But, relying upon our situational awareness, we can still give, say, seven, eight, or nine votes to the Sneakycrat, thus providing the Vegecrat with the maximal advantage, while in effect still voting against the Nastycrat by giving some significant assertable support to the Sneakycrat.

So therefor, approval voting can only provide unpredictable, random immunity to the spoiler effect, but strategic hedge simple score voting can provide fairly reliable immunity from it.


#4

What if I vote (10, 0, 0, …, 0)?


#5

With simple score voting you cannot vote “vote (10, 0, 0, …, 0),” since a zero vote is not allowed. You can only give an abstentious vote (ignore an on-the-ballot candidate). Otherwise some official could throw out your entire ballot as “spoiled” because you innocently neglected to give every candidate a score.

If you are perhaps foolish, you can always bullet vote with any score or approval system.


#6

Then what about (10, n, n, …, n) for some n with 1 <= n <= 9?


#7

Q/ Then what about (10, n, n, …, n) for some n with 1 <= n <= 9? /Q

Those (n) votes are hedge votes, presumably given to lesser evil “elite” controlled candidates, in order to help block greater evil “elite” controlled candidates. This is the only viable strategy. So-called “bullet voting”, or goody-goody voting (so-called “honest” voting, or rectitudinous voting) would be self-defeating voter malpractice.


#8

Done.


#9

Well, if you’re pretty much OK with the two-party system, but are just concerned that your half of it is getting shortchanged, then IRV looks just fine. You get to face your duopoly counterpart head to head, ensuring that the correct major party wins. Obviously there are caveats, but I don’t know if the readership of the Kos is fully aware of them.


#10

Kos also kicked me off.


#11

I’m with @Marylander, here.

It’s only better if you’re closely aligned with one of the two major parties.
If you’re outside the 2 party system, IRV will still functionally prevent any but the two major parties from gaining seats (spoiler effect, etc) while decreasing the likelihood that meaningful reform would be passed (“but we solved that problem!”).