Sort of. I think vote buying/selling being possible implies and voter coercion is possible and visa-versa. One difference is that the voter wants to sell their vote. They aren’t being threatened. They may approach the buyer themselves.
The slides say “every voter can personally access the blockchain to verify the integrity of their own vote”, and “the open vote software will contain options to verify that your own vote was actually recorded as you specified”. Do you know how that will work?
Not if the buyer/coercer can tell if the vote has been changed.
It’s easy enough to make that impossible, but only if you give up on end-to-end verifiability.
Basically, the trouble comes when you want to do all of these:
- Only allow authorized voters to vote, and only once
- Allow voters to verify that their vote is cast and recorded correctly
- Allow voters to authenticate the election
- Disallow vote buying/coercion
- Vote online
I’ve seen many proposed systems, but the best they mange is 4 out of 5. Estonia fails #3. Another blockchain-based internet voting protocol fails #4. The end-to-end verifiable systems I’ve seen (here’s one example) fail #5.
People have been trying to create end-to-end verifiable voting systems. It’s just hard. Or maybe impossible, though I hope not. I want internet voting, so if you’ve thought of something new, I want to hear it. That’s why I’m asking about common weaknesses of other systems.
Depends on how your voter registration system works. The buyer watching the voter if just one possible vector. Can voters sell their voting credentials? Estonia prevents that by requiring voters to use their irreplaceable, uncopyable, national ID smart card.
If voters can send their information, a buyer could set up a website to pay people in exchange for that information. This could be relatively large-scale.