Simple Ranked Voting


Simple ranked voting is very simple. Voters cast votes on a ranked place ballot in accordance with their intentions: =/ 1st > 2nd > 3rd > 4th… /=. Only one candidate (or no candidate at all) may be chosen for each place. The 1st place candidate is granted 10 votes, 2nd place gets 9 votes, 3rd place gets 8 votes, and so on. The 10th place candidate is granted 1 vote, and any further places are granted no votes. All of the votes are added up, and the candidate who was granted the most votes is the winner.

Absolutely nothing is done to interfere with the voter’s usage of the hedge strategy in order to thwart the double bind dilemma, which is the cause of “lesser evil” candidates becoming elected even when preferred “paladin” candidates are potentially available.

Using the hedge strategy, voters can grant 1st place (cast 10 votes) to a paladin – perhaps a “Ralph Nader”, while granting 2nd place to some lesser evil candidate, thus substantially contributing to the avoidance of “greater evil” winners. This process will eventually disrupt the two-party lock-in which is responsible for the many ongoing political disasters.

Note that this method is purely summative at the “precinct level.”

Of course there is the by-now well-known “ranked choice”/“instant runoff” (“RCV”/“IRV”) tabulation method, which frustrates usage of the hedge strategy and thus ensures the continuation of the disastrous two-party lock-in. (This demonstrates that ballot design and tabulation method are two completely distinct subject areas.) This tabulation method could be termed “summative-eliminative”.

Note that “RCV”/“IRV”, “choose-one”, “approval,” “STAR,” and so on, methods do nothing to actually assist rectitudinous (so-called “honest”) voters, since they will always do their best to express their actual preferences (they are, at bottom, protest voters). Such methods can only frustrate strategic hedge voting, and thus automatically perpetuate the two-party lock-in disaster.

Presumably, the voters have the right to continue to be frustrated, so therefor, at each election, they should be enabled to cast a separate vote to determine whether the simple ranked, or alternatively, the “RCV”/“IRV” tabulation method should be applied to their ballots.


This is a thing. It’s called Borda count.


The simple ranked voting method may superficially resemble the Borda method, but they are tabulated in vastly different ways. They are only the same if there are exactly 10 candidates. With Borda the number of votes granted to each candidate depends upon the number of candidates in the election.

With the Borda method, the 1st place candidate receives the number of votes equal to the number of official candidates, the 2nd place one gets one less vote, and so on. So if there are, say, 23 official candidates, the first place candidate will receive 23 votes. And the last place candidate will always receive just 1 vote.

If elections ever become “popular” again there could be 200,000,000 voters who decide to be candidates. Election officials could erect artificial barriers to limit the number of official candidates, but power is zero-sum in regard to the total portion of assertable support in any given election. Thus any power granted to officials must be subtracted from power available to the voters.

This Borda method is thus far from simple, and by increasing “cognitive load” would create a level of obfuscation sufficient to interfere with the hedge method of voting, which is necessary to thwart the double bind dilemma. So it would thereby interfere with removal of the disastrous two-party lock-in.

Additionally, it would essentially make the hand counting of paper ballots far too difficult, and thus force the voters to rely on machines administered by the ever-questionable election officials.


I see no reason to actually use Simple Ranked for anything. The IRV propagandists are not going to accept anything that fails their “later no harm” nonsense. Anyone not that blind should just use simple Score voting. This just forces people to use the numbers 10,9,8,… down however they like. (Which is better than Borda, admittedly, since you are not forced to give support to candidates you do not like.)

With simple Score, you might have two non-pirate candidates you like equally, and may want to give them both 10 points. This still lets you do the hedge strategy. Under Simple Ranked, you are forced to use up the 10 and 9 slots, and then give either 8 points or 0 points to your next choice.


So “score but worse”?

Suppose I want to use your hedge strategy, but I want to dock the lesser evil more than a single point, for example, perhaps I want to vote {Best: 10; OK: 6; Bad: 0}. In a race where there are 3 candidates on the ballot, there is no way to do this, since I would need to have filler candidates in the 2nd-4th positions. I suppose I could exploit the write-in option and fill the positions with nonsense, but write-ins are not always allowed, and requiring voters to find loopholes to cast a particular vote is horribly unfair.