STV versus Condorcet forms of STV

Disregarding complexity (unless it’s extreme), which leads to better results?

Also, can STV with equal-ranking (either one vote per candidate, and only one candidate elected at a time, or one vote split up between candidates) capture some of the consensus benefits of Condorcet-STV methods?

My best guess as to how Condorcet can be applied to STV in the least controversial way possible is if there was a way to focus it on individual Droop Quotas, where a moderate in the quota could be elected instead of being eliminated for having fewer 1st choice votes.

Schulze-STV does pairwise comparisons of winner sets rather than of candidates. It only compares winner sets that differ by one candidate, for example, {A1,…, An} and {B, A2,…, An}. A ballot may be assigned to any candidate Ai in the first set A if it prefers Ai to B. It may also be unassigned. The ballots are assigned in a way that maximizes the minimum number of ballots assigned to a candidate in the first set, which is the votes for the first set beating the second set. To determine the number of votes for the second set beating the first, this procedure is done in reverse.

When sets that differ by more than one candidate, they can only be compared by comparing the strength of the strongest path from the first set to the second against the strongest path from the second set to the first. The Schulze method is used to determine the winning set. (There is guaranteed to be a set for which the path strength from that set to any other is greater than the reverse. That set is the winner.)

It is a lot more complicated than STV. However, it is still Droop Proportional, and as resistant to vote management as is possible to do while remaining Droop Proportional.